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IS THE FIRST AMENDMENT
HOSTILE TO RELIGION?
PROTECTING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: JUDICIAL AND
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES
Gerard V. Bradley*
Is the First Amendment hostile to religion? Answering that ques-
tion requires at least the usual professorial ration of caveats. I as-
sure you that I will directly answer the question. I submit, though,
that the caveats constitute a more important, deeper response, a re-
sponse which questions the question itself. Were I more radical in
my intellectual sympathies, I would propose to deconstruct the
question.
I take the question to be about the religion clauses of the First
Amendment. Are they hostile to religion? Before World War II that
question was rarely posed. That is only partly because a negative
response, surprisingly even among Mormons and Roman Catholics
who found their protections a bit thin, 1 could be presumed. They
thought that the First Amendment was a great thing and also
thought it was being ignored by various political officials. Mostly it
is because prior to World War II - that is, prior to their judicial
incorporation via construction of the Due Process Clause - the reli-
gion clauses were unimportant to the religious life of the nation. The
Supreme Court's 1845 Permoli v. Municipality No. I2 decision put
the matter succinctly. The Court stated that "[t]he Constitution
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1889) (upholding a law which prohibited bigamists or
polygamists from voting in elections), overruled by Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding a criminal statute prohibiting bigamy
and affirming a Mormon's conviction under that law), overruled by Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707 (1981); Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845) (upholding a city
ordinance which prohibited any corpse to be exposed in Catholic churches), superseded by statute
as stated in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985).
2. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
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makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states
in their religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and
laws: nor is there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the
United States in this respect on the states."'
The vast bulk of interaction between the legal order and our reli-
gious life had been and continues to be at the state level.4 That is
where schools, churches, and orphanages come into daily contact
with the law, where authority over church property disputes is lo-
cated, and where laws governing incorporation are promulgated.
Permoli, for instance, involved a New Orleans regulation confining
Catholic funerals to a single, designated chapel.5 That regulation
was a political intervention on one side of a protracted schism in the
Louisiana Catholic Church, one of the many conflicts between
Catholic trustees and clerics in the antebellum era.' The Supreme
Court did not hesitate to decline jurisdiction.
It is only within the last generation or two that our religious plu-
ralism has reached the point where a large range of responses to the
question from the believer's perspective is possible. From the law's
point of view, pluralism in constitutional construction opens up an-
other range of possible responses.' Any answer to the question is
impossible until a specific meaning is ascribed to the religion
clauses. To do that we must adopt a particular methodology for con-
stitutional construction. There are lots of alternatives. Even after
agreeing upon a method - for instance, originalism - we are still
liable to disagree about the results of historical investigation. Just
consider the contrary historical conclusions of Leo Pfeffer9 and Leo-
nard Levy'0 on one side, and Robert Cord" and Justice Rehnquist 2
3. Id. at 609.
4. See Harold J. Berman, Religion and Law: The First Amendment in Historical Perspeclive,
35 EMORY L.J. 777, 778 (1986) ("[The first amendment left the protection of religious liberty at
the state level to the states themselves and . . . the Framers expressed no intent concerning how
the states should exercise their responsibilities in the matter.").
5. Permoli, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 590.
6. See id. at 591-92.
7. Id. at 610 ("In our judgment, the question presented by the record is exclusively of slate
cognizance. ... ).
8. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375 (discussing pluralism with respect to First Amendment
free speech).
9. Leo Pfeffer embraces the strict separation of church and state. See LEO PFEFFER, RI:LI-
cIous FREEDOM (1977) (commenting on the historical development of free exercise rights).
10. Leonard Levy favors strict separation of church and state. See LEONARD W. LEVY, iHE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986).
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on the other side, of the Establishment Clause debate.
Moreover, it can be difficult to determine if religion has been
treated in a hostile manner by any particular judicial decision. Is
religion adversely treated when Jehovah's Witnesses are allowed
to, 13 or legally prevented from,14 setting up in a residential neigh-
borhood a loudspeaker blaring a virulent anti-Catholic message?
What if it is an entirely Catholic neighborhood? What if the Wit-
nesses have fully imbibed Judge Rutherford's 5 teaching that all
earthly institutions, including all government as well as the Roman
Catholic Church, are works of the devil? Is it "hostile" to the Wit-
nesses to be fined by political powers whose illegitimacy is the mes-
sage they preach, especially if we view, from a purely sociological
perspective, the "hostile" reaction as a boon to group cohesion?
True, we are accustomed to viewing the First Amendment reli-
gion clauses as guaranteeing religious liberty. Besides Stanley
Hauerwas's argument that religious liberty has been a disaster for
the Christian church,'6 consider the claims of liberal theorists like
John Rawls and Jeff Stout that religion is treated as hospitably as
possible, consistent with an overriding commitment to avoid secta-
rian warfare.' 7
Suppose we agree to apply the religion clauses to state govern-
ment. Suppose we have adopted a methodology and it has yielded an
11. Robert Cord advances the view that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit government
aid to religion on a nonpreferential basis, rather it is designed to prevent the government from
discriminating between religions or favoring one religion over another. Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights
.Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933, 968
n.125 (1989).
12. Justice Rehnquist believes that "[tlhe true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only
be seen in its history." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985). He further asserts that the
Establishment Clause does not require total government neutrality between "religion and non-
religion." Id. at 92.
13. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (holding that an ordinance which prohibited
the use of loudspeakers except with permission of the police chief was unconstitutional).
14. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (asserting that sound amplification is subject to
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions).
15. Judge Joseph Franklin Rutherford took over the leadership of the Jehovah's Witnesses in
1917. See William S. McAninch, A Catalyst for the Evolution of Constitutional Law: Jehovah's
Witnesses in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 997, 1007 (1987).
16. For Hauerwas's views, see STANLEY HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER: TOWARD
A CONSTRUCTIVE CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHIC (1981).
17. See JOHN RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Rawls, a modern liberal theorist, believes,
like the Enlightenment thinkers, that "publicly loosed religion leads in the short run to unmanage-
able conflict and in the long run to an authoritarian polity." Gerard V. Bradley, Church Auton-
omy in the Constitutional Order: The End of Church and State?, 49 LA. L. REv. 1057, 1059
(1989).
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intelligible principle or norm. Further assume only one potential
beneficiary is party to the case. Let's call our principle or norm "re-
ligious liberty." Still, we may ask: Whose definition of "religious
liberty" do we use? There is no neutrality here, and no Esperanto.'8
There is not only a plurality of religions but, not accidentally, a plu-
rality of conceptions of "religious liberty."
Consider the long struggle in our history between Protestants and
Catholics over the definition of two critical terms: "liberty of con-
science" and "religious liberty." For Protestants, liberty of con-
science has always meant, positively, individual interpretation of
Scripture and the direct unmediated encounter of the soul with God
through grace." For Catholics, it has commonly, and negatively,
been understood as an anti-Catholic slogan which expressed hostility
to the Church, especially the priesthood. It was what we now might
call a "code phrase" for Bible reading in the public schools.
Spiritual or religious liberty has historically meant to American
Catholics about the same thing as ecclesiastical liberty.2 This is not
the Protestant notion of individual liberty of conscience,2" but it fo-
cuses on the immunity and freedom of the church as an organized
religious body in society. To Protestants, especially Calvin, the spiri-
tual in earthly manifestation was the person and his conscience.22
The church was a more ephemeral teaching instrument, not the ark
of salvation. Indeed, to most Protestant Americans, the ecclesiasti-
cal has been the enemy of the spiritual. To Catholics, ecclesiastical
and spiritual have been not only harmonious but practically
identical.
We should here note various vignettes alongside this central
18. See Gerard V. Bradley, The Enduring Revolution: Law and Theology in the Secular Sate,
39 EMORY L.J, 217, 249 (1990).
19. See M. SEARLE BATES. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY (1972).
20. See Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty. 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1559, 1587 (1989) (identifying the issue regarding the relationship between ecclesiast.ical
and civil matters).
21. Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1386-87 (1967) (explaining the historical evolution of the concept of reli-
gious liberty).
22. " 'There is nothing of Christ, then, in him who does not hold the elementary principle, that
it is God alone who enlightens our minds to perceive his truth, who by his Spirit seals it on our
hearts, and by his sure attestation to it confirms our conscience.' " Michael W. McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV L. REV. 1410,
1490 n.417 (1990) (quoting JOHN CALVIN, Reply to Letter by Cardinal Sadole to the Senate and
People of Geneva, in JOHN CALVIN: SELECTIONS FROM HIS WRITINGS 81, 105 (J. Dillenberger ed.,
1971)).
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theme, including the nineteenth-century Mormons who, it seems to
me, concluded that political autonomy was essential to their reli-
gious freedom. 23  For the Mormons, as for most Muslims, Native
Americans, 24 Clifford Geertz's Negarans,26 and for any inhabitant
of a cosmologically ordered society, there is no separation of church
and state. Consequently, they do not regard religious liberty in the
central sense defined by our Constitution - a state which is theo-
logically agnostic.28
Is the First Amendment hostile to religion? Here I answer the
question as directly as I can - as judicially interpreted between
1947 and until a couple years ago, the First Amendment was hostile
to all religion which was not privatized.27 This answer depends,
however, on what the judicial doctrine of the Establishment Clause
is. If courts interpret the Establishment Clause to require "no en-
dorsement," I stand by my answer. I do not agree that Employment
Division v. Smith28 was hostile to religion, insofar as it abandoned a
line of cases which, in my view, reinforced the privatization of
religion.
Is the First Amendment hostile to religion? Let me now answer
the question directly. The question conflates two quite different
modes of discourse about our common life. What the First Amend-
ment means is a question of construing an enactment. It is a matter
of textual construction and thus presents a question of interpretation
for which an interpretive, or perhaps an exegetical, theory is
appropriate.
For reasons that cannot even be briefly sketched on this occasion,
23. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (illustrating the conflict between state
law and the Mormons' religious acceptance of bigamy), overruled by Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707 (1981).
24. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (illustrat-
ing a conflict between the government's need to build a logging road and the Native Americans'
desire to preserve their ancient burial grounds).
25. For a discussion of the Negarans, see CLIFFORD GEERTZ, NEGARA: THE THEATER STATE IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY BALI (1980).
26. See Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and
Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1491 (1987). But see Steven D.
Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No
Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987) (criticizing the rationale of the "no endorse-
ment test").
27. " 'The Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the
family, and the institutions of private choice, and that while some involvement and entanglement
are inevitable, lines must be drawn.' " Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. 459 U.S. 116, 126 (1982)
(quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971)).
28. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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I think some form of originalism 29 is the appropriate vehicle for
such a task. Originalism, however, cannot tell us whether the reli-
gion clauses are good or bad for religion. To make such a value
judgment is a matter for legal theory and its parent disciplines of
ethics, social theory, and political theory, all informed by the de-
scriptive disciplines including sociology, anthropology, and ethnogra-
phy. Therefore, it is not merely a matter of interpretation or exege-
sis. We may arrive at some judgment as to what is the most
rationally appealing account of religious liberty, but perhaps not. If
the near universal condemnation of Smith30 is any barometer, we
will probably settle on some version of liberalism's harm and neu-
trality principles.
Therefore, a better and more critical question is whether liber-
alism is hostile to religion. In other words, is recent judicial inter-
pretation of the First Amendment hostile to religion? This question
of whether *liberalism is hostile to religion must be distinguished
from, and seen as properly having little to do with, the meaning of
the religion clauses.
I propose to leave free exercise about where the Smith Court left
it: neutrality of reasons." Government may not make the truth or
falsity of a theological proposition the basis for action.32 Put differ-
ently, any law aimed at the suppression of an action because of' its
religious significance is unconstitutional. Absolutely. There is no
balancing test here. I think Smith accords not only with the original
understanding, but with the tradition of its judicial constructilon.
Before 1940 it was the judicial doctrine of free exercise virtually
29. The core tenet of originalism holds that judges should interpret the Constitution by ascer-
taining and giving effect to the original intent of the Constitution's Framers and ratifiers. James
A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundations of Originalism: An Account and Critique, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1991).
30. See, e.g., James D. Gordon 1II, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REN'. 91
(1991); Kenneth Marin, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Alters the Sta,'e of
Free Exercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1431 (1992); William L. Montague, Jr., Employment
Division v. Smith: Overlooking the Middle Ground in Free Exercise Analysis, 80 Ky. L.J. 531
(1991-92); Tom Stacy, Death, Privacy, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
490, 559 (1992).
31. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 880-81.
32. "'It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices
to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds.'" Id. at 887 (quot-
ing Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)). See also United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944) (holding that the district court judge correctly withheld all questions
from the jury which concerned the truth or falsity of the respondent's religious beliefs and tenets),
rev'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
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without exception in all fifty jurisdictions. In the 1940s, starting
with Minersville School District v. Gobitis3 and more so in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,14 its reign was chal-
lenged and modified. But not until the 1960s was it killed and for-
mally buried.36 Still, among the many cases reported in the 1961
volume of the United States Reports, only McGowan v. Maryland,36
Braunfeld v. Brown,3 7 and Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley8 remain. Two Guys excerpts, quite approvingly,
though it is difficult to say its reasoning was adopted, the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court opinion of 1848 in Specht v. Commonwealth.39
Specht is a perfect statement of what the original understanding of
free exercise was. We should take it as the principle of free exercise
judicially enforced, and conduct the remainder of the debate in the
public square, outside the courthouse.
Smith does not leave us with simple facial neutrality, as its critics
suggest. A statute which says nothing whatsoever about religion
may still be unconstitutional. Examples include post-Gobitis ordi-
nances which conditioned a permit to distribute literature solely on
the applicants giving the flag salute and Pledge of Allegiance. °
Note another criticism of Smith which misses its mark. Critics
argue that Smith mutes the religious voice, that it subordinates con-
33. 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding a school regulation requiring schoolchildren to salute the
flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance over the objection of Jehovah's Witnesses), overruled by
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
34. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Gobitis because the state regulation was not a permissible
means of achieving national unity).
35. See Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and
Abortion, 25 GA. L. REV. 923, 1064-66 (1991).
36. 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding a Maryland law which prohibited certain activities on
Sunday).
37. 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding a Sunday closing law).
38. 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (upholding a Sunday closing law as not violating the First Amend-
ment because its purpose was secular).
39. 8 Pa. 312 (1848). The court states:
In a Christian community, where a very large majority of the people celebrate the
first day of the week as their chosen period to rest from labour, it is not surprising
that that day should have received the legislative sanction: and as it is also devoted to
religious observances, we are prepared to estimate the reason why the statute should
speak of it as the Lord's day, and denominate the infraction of its legalized rest, a
profanation. Yet this does not change the character of the enactment. It is still, es-
sentially, but a civil regulation made for the government of man as a member of
society . ...
Id. at 323 (emphasis added).
40. McAninch, supra note 15, at 1019. See, e.g., Kennedy v. City of Moscow, 39 F. Supp. 26
(D. Idaho 1941).
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science to the fiat of government, even that Smith means there is no
sovereign God." Nearly the opposite is true. Of course, nothing in
Smith prevents government from opening the flood gates of exemp-
tions. And momentarily I suggest why government ought largely do
so. Smith simply gets courts out of the business of declaring consci-
entious action subordinate to legal commands, out of the business of
declaring that religiously motivated actions are a threat to compel-
ling government interests. Smith says that no deliberate attack upon
religion is permitted, period.42 Smith's critics are the ones who pre-
fer authoritative declarations of subordination, and who prefer to
"balance" God's commands against the needs of Caesar. Caesar, ex-
perience has shown, almost invariably wins. 3
The conflation of the interpretive and normative projects and de-
liverance of the consolidated enterprise into the hands of the Consti-
tution's black-robed guardians is not unprecedented before World
War II. What is unprecedented is that it should characterize consti-
tutional law, so much so that, especially in the church-state area,
almost no one self-consciously distinguishes the normative question
- the most cogent account of religious liberty - from constitu-
tional construction.
How should the normative problem be handled? As I said, the
Constitution provides a regulative principle, one that should not
often need to be invoked by parties to the conversation. That is one
reason why the conflation of normative and interpretive discourses
has been mischievous: we need to think about religious liberty fiee
of the mental constraints that implicit commitments to judicial en-
forcement impose.
I think that public debate about religious liberty in our pluralistic
society can proceed quite well if grounded in reason. Reason dis-
closes that religion is truly a good for everyone, and society rightly
promotes it. Religion is a personal relationship with a more than
human source of meaning and value. Religion, or the good of it fbr
human persons, is intrinsically voluntary because it involves adher-
ence to certain propositions as true, as really disclosing a transcen-
dent reality which is a fit object of worship and prayer. Religion is,
and should be acknowledged as, a basic human good. Government
41. See Gordon, supra note 30, at 110; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and
the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1151 (1990).
42. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990).
43. Matthew 22:21.
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ought to promote it. The religion clauses, construed faithfully on an
originalist basis, work no barrier to that proposal. The Lemon test'4
does. Thus, we should get rid of the Lemon test.
Conscience, which is harmony among a person's feelings, beliefs,
judgments, and actions, is also a good for everyone, and society
rightly promotes it. Autonomy is a condition for realizing this good
too. Together with free exercise's foreclosure of religious truth as a
ground for government action, these two goods of all persons make
for a powerful presumption in favor of freedom to act on the basis
of religious belief. Only good reasons may justify intrusion upon
conscientious action.
I insist that judges are not well suited to make these calculations.
The challenge is to determine the ensemble of social conditions most
conducive to realization by everyone of the diverse basic human
goods. This complex, prudential judgment will not be well done by
politically isolated persons, employing the restricted reasoning of
law to facts adduced in the course of litigation.
44. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (providing a test to determine whether a
statute violates the Establishment Clause: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
-pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion
. . . finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion").
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